Giving: On donating disposable income

[Epistemologist]

Utilitarian ethicist Peter Singer writes that affluent people such as those in the West should help those who are less fortunate, such as those who are afflicted by famine. He outlines his position in a simple argument:

1. Suffering is bad
2. If we can prevent bad, then we should prevent bad
3. Therefore we should give all/most of our disposable income to those who are suffering

We assume that suffering is bad. That seems rather obvious.

The developments of modern times have facilitated our being able to prevent bad, such as famine in a country that is thousands of miles away. While people in the past were separated by vast oceans and lack of communication, it is now much easier to gain access or information all over the world, so distance is not a major factor inhibiting our being able to help those who are suffering.

Also, whether or not other people are giving to help those who are suffering is irrelevant. If one can prevent bad, then one should prevent bad, regardless of others choose to do.

That sums up Singer's position. He says that charity is not supererogatory (good to do but not bad not to do), but is a moral obligation. And thus, we ought to give our disposable income, the money/resources that we can give, to help the suffering.

This seems like a reasonable position. Certainly, it is prima facie condemnable to go spend five hundred dollars on a Gucci purse when that money could feed a few families for Thanksgiving. It also seems bad to spend one billion dollars on a fighter plane when all that money could be spent for famine relief and population control.

But if this position is the right one, and giving is what we ought to do, why do so many of us not do it? Do we realize what we are doing and consciously commit a wrong? Some feel genuinely guilty about not giving. But for many, the main problem in applying Singer's conclusion is in determining what they "can" do to prevent bad.

For these people, it may be the case that they feel they simply "cannot" part with any of their income. While we may label that income spent of putatively frivolous items as disposable, they may view it as essential. It is here that they are being rather selfish.

Do I donate my disposable income? Well, as a student, I do not have any. But if I did have it, I fear that even I, the one presenting Singer's position to you, would not. The notion that I decide what I do with my money still rings in my ears. But I also keep in mind that giving should be choice regardless. Yes, it may a choice that we obligated to make, but we would still choose what to do with our money. That is, we would do the good.

[tivodan1116]

The problem is that charity often does not work.

Take the example you use of famine. Particularly in Africa, most aid attempts in Africa are futile because they wind up diverted to corrupt governments. What would help those people more than anything are definitive property rights and an overhaul of their systems of law so that they can put down stakes and develop businesses.

One of the few types of charity that works in this situation are business incubation grants. Many poor people have great business ideas but no seed money. There exist charities that give grants and loans.

[Epistemologist]

Quote by: tivodan1116 The problem is that charity often does not work. Take the example you use of famine. Particularly in Africa, most aid attempts in Africa are futile because they wind up diverted to corrupt governments. What would help those people more than anything are definitive property rights and an overhaul of their systems of law so that they can put down stakes and develop businesses. One of the few types of charity that works in this situation are business incubation grants. Many poor people have great business ideas but no seed money. There exist charities that give grants and loans.

Well, charity is not just money. It could entail time and efforts to make sure that suffering is minimized. To the famine problem, many objectors say that giving aid to help short-term famine is simply prolonging the inevitable, whereas each generation of those helped will need more help.

Singer suggests that in addition to material aid versus famine, there should be active efforts at population control of those affected by famine. Aid would be given, for instance, only to those countries that institute population control measures.

As for corrupt governments receiving the aid, again, it should be emphasized that what the affluent ought to do is help those who are suffering. And thus, the affluent should work to make sure that those are suffering receive that aid in spite of the obstacles to doing so.

[Kamehameha34]

His argument is flawed.

1. Suffering is bad
2. If we can prevent bad, then we should prevent bad
3. Therefore we should give all/most of our disposable income to those who are suffering

Even if we accept all of the premises as true, the conclusion isn't a necessary logical consequence.

Sterilized, his argument is the following:

1. A = B.
2. If C can prevent B, then C should prevent B.
3. C should D.

His mistake is assuming that D = notB, or that donating disposable income automatically equals less suffering. We call that fallacy of the four terms. I'd ask for evidence that the amount of donations towards the impoverished has a direct correlation to a decrease in suffering, but I'm not going to. It's a fool's game.

[Osborn F Enready]

There is no "we".

"I" may choose to donate to worthwhile causes, because "I" feel that cause is worthy.

Charity is a fine thing as an individual act.

Its a vile and despicable thing when forced via taxation and wealth redistribution.

[Epistemologist]

Quote by: Kamehameha34 His mistake is assuming that D = notB, or that donating disposable income automatically equals less suffering. We call that fallacy of the four terms. I'd ask for evidence that the amount of donations towards the impoverished has a direct correlation to a decrease in suffering, but I'm not going to. It's a fool's game.

The affluent can prevent suffering.
The affluent should prevent suffering.

Regardless of whether or not past attempts at help fail or the expected efficacy of a certain way of giving fails, one thing remains constant according to the argument: the affluent should prevent suffering.

Now, I suppose Singer's argument has many implied premises. As far as giving DI goes, it should be clear that money can be spent on resources, and since DI is money, DI can be spent on resources. It should also be clear that much suffering is due to lack of resources; Singer was writing concerning a Bangladeshi famine, so that resource needed is food. That suffering could be thereby lessened by more resources, which is what giving does.

As I mentioned before, Singer actually argues for more than just giving monetary DI, but other disposable resources such as time and efforts. But still, DI is something that we can give by definition, so he argues that we ought to give it because it should prevent suffering. If there are obstacles to that happening, such as apathetic citizens or corrupt receiving governments, then in order to fulfill our obligation to prevent suffering, we should work to ensure that those obstacles are absent.

If the affluent shrug off this moral obligation thinking it is something impractical or something the government alone should be doing, then according to Singer, they are doing wrong. Shrugging it off is a fool's game.

Quote by: Osborn F Enready There is no "we". "I" may choose to donate to worthwhile causes, because "I" feel that cause is worthy. Charity is a fine thing as an individual act. Its a vile and despicable thing when forced via taxation and wealth redistribution.

Indeed, making the decision to donate is an individual, independent decision, just as the decision to do right/wrong is an individual, independent decision. I think it should be a sincere effort. If it was forced, maybe a favorable end consequence of less suffering still ensues, but there is yet another cost of liberty, which is not good.

But when I say "we," I mean that the group of affluent individuals who can prevent suffering all have the moral obligation to prevent suffering. Whether or not each does is matter of whether or not each does what they ought to do.

[The Bacon Guy]

Quote by: Pist The affluent can prevent suffering. The affluent should prevent suffering.

But that they should therefore give to charity does not follow. Who's to say that the suffering of people in developing countries is greater than that of a rich man who suddenly loses a significant portion of his money?

[Epistemologist]

Quote by: The Bacon Guy But that they should therefore give to charity does not follow. Who's to say that the suffering of people in developing countries is greater than that of a rich man who suddenly loses a significant portion of his money?

It doesn't matter. Charity is giving your own resources to those who are less fortunate. So even if that rich man lost a lot of his money, he would cease to be a rich man, and thus be less fortunate than the affluent. So regardless of who it is they are helping, the affluent should prevent suffering. When that former rich man is helped, there are still many others who would need it as well.

Regardless of the variable recipient, the affluent have an invariable obligation to charity. In deciding who gets what first, some other considerations may come into play as well. For instance, with the famine-stricken countries, aid may be given first to only those who promise to have means of population control available. An affluent family may choose to help a struggling person next door rather than people living thousands of miles away as well, but they would still be fulfilling their obligation.

Some might say that yes, they helped that neighbor, but as long as they have a few more dollars and few more hours of disposable resources left, they should keep using it to help more people. They claim Singer's position is impractical because it requires too much of people, so that the affluent give so much that they get to the same level as the suffering. However, charity can follow a course of marginal utility; the affluent give only so much that they they do not necessarily end up at the same level as the suffering, but they still give nonetheless. Any further giving beyond the point of marginal utility may be considered what they cannot give, and thus are not morally obligated to give.

[The Bacon Guy]

Quote by: Pist However, charity can follow a course of marginal utility; the affluent give only so much that they they do not necessarily end up at the same level as the suffering, but they still give nonetheless.

It might not be possible for a rich man to give anything away without suffering himself. If we assume that one dollar alleviates one unit of suffering for a starving African child, but that for a particular rich man, losing one dollar causes two units of suffering, he is then, from your own premises, morally obligated to keep his money.

[Arawn-ap-Hywel]

Quote by: Epistemologist We assume that suffering is bad. That seems rather obvious.

To assume this takes away the rights of those whom may prefer to suffer.

And whilst we continue to handout, some of those whom are suffering have no motivation to alleviate their situation

Whilst it is laudable to be charitable in order to set someone back on their feet, it is difficult to reconcile those whom leach off such charity

A great man once said "The poor are always with us!"

It is part of society and of the type of locality people are in, parts of the world have always suffered from droughts or floods, tornados or hurricanes yet still the populations choose to live their and often still insist on trying to create large families that they cannot sustain.

This world is tough, and it is a fact of life for all creatures that the weak do not survive

[Cephus]

Just giving money to the poor doesn't guarantee that they'll stop being poor, simply because the reason they are poor to begin with is they don't know how not to be. Give the poor $10,000 and they'll buy $10,000 worth of drugs and alcohol and still have nothing. It really makes no sense to just go around handing out cash to people who have demonstrated nothing but a complete failure to properly use it.

[Epistemologist]

Quote by: The Bacon Guy It might not be possible for a rich man to give anything away without suffering himself. If we assume that one dollar alleviates one unit of suffering for a starving African child, but that for a particular rich man, losing one dollar causes two units of suffering, he is then, from your own premises, morally obligated to keep his money.

It is possible that a person simply cannot give. Then, yes, according to this argument, he/she would not be obligated to give. But is this frequently the case with the affluent? I doubt it.

Quote by: Arawn-ap-Hywel To assume this takes away the rights of those whom may prefer to suffer. And whilst we continue to handout, some of those whom are suffering have no motivation to alleviate their situation Whilst it is laudable to be charitable in order to set someone back on their feet, it is difficult to reconcile those whom leach off such charity

If they prefer it, then it's not really suffering to them. But I think it is reasonable to assume that those who experience famine, disease, and disasters are for the most part suffering. Regardless of how they react to the end of their suffering, we would still have a moral obligation to help if we can help.

Consider a little kid drowning in a shallow pool. We walk by, and think that we can save them. We may get mud on our shoes, but we still can save them. And even if the kid slaps you afterwards because he was trying to commit suicide, you've done your duty. It would have been unreasonable to assume he was trying to commit suicide without further information, even if he wasn't hollering for help.

Quote by: Arawn-ap-Hywel A great man once said "The poor are always with us!" It is part of society and of the type of locality people are in, parts of the world have always suffered from droughts or floods, tornados or hurricanes yet still the populations choose to live their and often still insist on trying to create large families that they cannot sustain. This world is tough, and it is a fact of life for all creatures that the weak do not survive

To simply accept the historical/evolutionary status quo is irresponsible. If there is something wrong, namely, suffering, we should try to stop it. We can make the world better than it is under the status quo. Shrugging it off as part of nature is not right.

Quote by: Cephus Just giving money to the poor doesn't guarantee that they'll stop being poor, simply because the reason they are poor to begin with is they don't know how not to be. Give the poor $10,000 and they'll buy $10,000 worth of drugs and alcohol and still have nothing. It really makes no sense to just go around handing out cash to people who have demonstrated nothing but a complete failure to properly use it.

Simply giving cash is not what we would be doing because cash is not the only disposable thing that the affluent can give. They can give time and effort to making sure that more than just money is handed out.

They can even make sure that more than just handouts are given out; they could, for instance, spend resources to train people to live a better life or even effect population control measures so the problem of stupid people living unwisely is lessened in the next generations. But whatever it is, these initiatives take resources that the affluent can and thus should give. Disposable income doesn't have to directly go to the suffering, as it could be spent on these programs.

[The Bacon Guy]

Quote by: Pist It is possible that a person simply cannot give. Then, yes, according to this argument, he/she would not be obligated to give.

Right, so we've established that the conclusion doesn't follow from the premises.

Now for the premises themselves. To use my example again, if one dollar alleviates one unit of suffering for a starving African child, but that for a particular rich man, losing one dollar causes 0.75 units of suffering, the rich man should, from your premises, be obligated to give his money away.

But why should this be that case? Why should the rich man be obligated to lower himself into suffering in order to help a complete stranger?

[Epistemologist]

Quote by: The Bacon Guy Right, so we've established that the conclusion doesn't follow from the premises.

No, I said that if a person can give, then they should give. If a person cannot give, then it's not necessarily the case that they should give. But I also said that for most affluent people, this is not the case, as they can give, and thus should give.

Quote by: The Bacon Guy Now for the premises themselves. To use my example again, if one dollar alleviates one unit of suffering for a starving African child, but that for a particular rich man, losing one dollar causes 0.75 units of suffering, the rich man should, from your premises, be obligated to give his money away. But why should this be that case? Why should the rich man be obligated to lower himself into suffering in order to help a complete stranger?

In your hypothetical example, it seems to be beyond the point of marginal utility for that "rich" man (I have rich in quotations because it is dubious considering the qualms over giving a dollar) to give one dollar because he would get rapidly closer to the sufferers' state with each dollar given. In that case, the "rich" man cannot give, and is not obligated to give.

However, your example is just that: hypothetical and not an accurate representation of real life. For most affluent, giving a dollar does not go beyond the point of marginal utility that I discussed previously, because they can give it without much suffering. Setting aside concerns that suffering cannot be quantified, I'll correct your example. While the dollar can alleviate one unit of suffering in the child, it may only cost the more accurate example of the rich man 0.001 unit of suffering. Giving a dollar, or even multiple dollars, would not be beyond the affluent person's capacity, and they would have an obligation to do it.

If you want to question the premises, I suggest you question the concept that can implies ought. If we can stop evil, are we obligated to do so?

[Cephus]

Quote by: Epistemologist Simply giving cash is not what we would be doing because cash is not the only disposable thing that the affluent can give. They can give time and effort to making sure that more than just money is handed out.

But time and effort are not something limited to the affluent, they're something that anyone can give.

They can even make sure that more than just handouts are given out; they could, for instance, spend resources to train people to live a better life or even effect population control measures so the problem of stupid people living unwisely is lessened in the next generations. But whatever it is, these initiatives take resources that the affluent can and thus should give. Disposable income doesn't have to directly go to the suffering, as it could be spent on these programs.

Unfortunately, trying to control the poor population is going to be met with calls of racism and hatred by the liberal asshats who seem to think that out of control breeding is a natural right.

I'm not disagreeing with you, I'm saying that there's a reason these people are poor to begin with and it has little to do with not having money, but with a complete inability to do anything useful with it. In today's world, it would be difficult to change the dynamics behind the poor because you've got a lot of people who think they have a right to be that way and trying to change it denies them their rights.

[Osborn F Enready]

Epistimologist said: No, I said that if a person can give, then they should give. If a person cannot give, then it's not necessarily the case that they should give. But I also said that for most affluent people, this is not the case, as they can give, and thus should give.

We aren't obligated or morally obligated to protect people from their own bad choices.

I don't think people "shoud" do anything unless THEY are compelled to do so.

[The Bacon Guy]

Quote by: Pist No, I said that if a person can give, then they should give. If a person cannot give, then it's not necessarily the case that they should give.

There is no physical barrier preventing the affluent from giving, hence they can give. If it causes them more suffering than it alleviates, then, from your premises, they shouldn't give. Your conclusion that the affluent should be obligated to give most/all of their disposable income to the suffering, is in conflict with this and is therefore false.

Quote by: Pist In your hypothetical example, it seems to be beyond the point of marginal utility for that "rich" man (I have rich in quotations because it is dubious considering the qualms over giving a dollar) to give one dollar because he would get rapidly closer to the sufferers' state with each dollar given. In that case, the "rich" man cannot give, and is not obligated to give.

He most certainly can give. There is no physical barrier to him giving, and, from your premises, there is no moral barrier. For there to be a moral barrier, your premise must then change to "If we can prevent bad, then we should prevent bad, as long as it doesn't violate an arbitrary and subjective threshold of selfishness".

Hence, your seemingly objective argument of “he who can give should give”, becomes the subjective and redundant argument of “He who should give should give”.

[Chancellor]

Quote by: Epistemologist But when I say "we," I mean that the group of affluent individuals who can prevent suffering all have the moral obligation to prevent suffering. Whether or not each does is matter of whether or not each does what they ought to do.

Why do we have a moral obligation to prevent suffering? From where does this obligation come? What constitutes the prevention of suffering?

[Chancellor]

Quote by: Epistemologist Regardless of the variable recipient, the affluent have an invariable obligation to charity. In deciding who gets what first, some other considerations may come into play as well. For instance, with the famine-stricken countries, aid may be given first to only those who promise to have means of population control available. An affluent family may choose to help a struggling person next door rather than people living thousands of miles away as well, but they would still be fulfilling their obligation.

You have yet to establish that this "obligation" even exists much less that it is invariable.

[ZNFYRH]

The choices above are missing one.

Charity is an individual's choice.

The OP mainly talks about the ethic of giving to others who need it.

There are times when I think it is right, and times when I don't, but that's my own personal morality.