Just wondering what your thoughts were on this example. What's better about believing objects are green and not grue? Is it really just that we like it better because of our language?
Nelson Goodman presented a different description of the problem of induction in the article "The New Problem of Induction" (1966). Goodman proposed a new predicate, "grue". Something is grue if it has been observed to be green before a given time t, or if it has been observed to be blue thereafter. The "new" problem of induction is, since all emeralds we have ever seen are both green and grue, why do we suppose that after time t we will find green but not grue emeralds? The standard scientific response is to invoke Occam's razor.
Goodman, however, points out that the predicate "grue" only appears more complex than the predicate "green" because we have defined grue in terms of blue and green. If we had always been brought up to think in terms of "grue" and "bleen" (where bleen is blue before time t, or green thereafter), we would intuitively consider "green" to be a crazy and complicated predicate. Goodman believed that which scientific hypotheses we favour depend on which predicates are "entrenched" in our language.