Free Will

[Section 8]

If a G-D or higher power did exist than wouldn't there be no free will. Wouldn't G-D have created time, or else G-D wouldn't be the highest power. If G-D created time than time would not fetter G-D and G-D would be able to see past, present, and future all at once like seeing a film strip all at once. That would mean that G-D already knows your actions, beliefs and your ideas before you were born. I'm not saying that this is true it just seems earily realistic.

Have fun
Shalom

[GreatWyrm of Babylon]

If you are looking for an arguement, the only thing I could argue with is your grammar...

[Section 8]

Wow I just realised how bad I messed up on the paragraph. Oh well it is still somewhat readible (somewhat.)

Have Fun
Shalom

[G. Adams]

I don't think God's existence impedes free will, but I do agree that there is no such thing as free will. All our actions are simply reactions made upon previous built up knowledge and instincts. When you really think about it, it doesn't matter how much you argue it, but its true.

[xm.bretton]

god didnt necessarily create time, he has existed for all time. there was no beginning, and there will be no end.

time is a unit we use to stay organized... we may see in smaller units than himself.

[Fallen Angel]

I don't think God created us to be mindless drones with no freewill, Section8, we are of course accountable to him for our actions after we die, but not during.

[Downwiththestereotype]

Originally posted by G. Adams@09-23-2003 06:30 PM I don't think God's existence impedes free will, but I do agree that there is no such thing as free will. All our actions are simply reactions made upon previous built up knowledge and instincts. When you really think about it, it doesn't matter how much you argue it, but its true.

I agre here, Free will is ultimatly a fals idea, as everything is a result of everything else. Some may argue that this 'pre-determination' is evidence of a god, or at least a higher plain of existance.
But just because we do not have free will, does it mean an entity is governing us? I beleive it is likely that all thiings are pre-determined, but for no reason or cause, they simply are.

In theory, if you new the velocity and position of every single sub atomic particle in the universe, you could predict all of existance until the end of time. But of course that is beyond anything that could actually be messured.

[Rave7pt0]

A few notes. I was discussing this with a Philosopher (David Fenner, he's a Ford Fellow, actually), and he pointed out something that I feel is important to this discussion: Free Will isn't an argument over whether there is an outside force controlling us, but about whether we have meaningful internal control.

I believe we do, and that as much as what we do is determined by movements around us, we also have the ability to move without cause. That means moving intelligently, and yes I phrased it like that purposely (Aquinas). I believe that is what's meant when they refer to God creating us in His image, at least in part. He is the uncaused effect, and through mechanisms I don't want to discuss here, he has given us the power to effect a radius of reaily around us without cause. This can be termed "free will."

Edit:

I phrased the second to last sentance like that for effect, but you can replace the last word, "cause," with "compulsion" and be more exact.

[GreatWyrm of Babylon]

DWS
You get that 'e' key fixed yet?

[Downwiththestereotype]

Originally posted by GreatWyrm of Babylon@10-06-2003 09:11 PM DWS You get that 'e' key fixed yet?

My keyboard runs on batteries, and when the start wearing down, the 'e' key is always the first to go.
dont ask why.

Rave7: Everything we do is because of a cause, even if you act without cause to prove me wrong you have a cause, everything is caused by something else no matter how obscure. Ultimatly we have no free will because we are ultimatly super complex reactions.

[Geoff332]

I always tie free will to intentionality (an idea I'm stealing without any shame off Searle). In philosophy (or at least in the philosophy of mind) inentionality means that your mind is directed at about or of objects and events in the world.

An action combines an intention and a movement. Together, they form an action. Actions can involve pre-meditated intentions (prior intention) or have an intention invoked when the movement is made (intention in action). Without intention, our movements are merely movements, rather than actions. For either to work requires consciousness -- at least to the extent of being aware of our movements and having some capacity to impose prior intentions on our movements.

When we form an intention (a thought directed to the external world) and combine it with some movement we have an action. Question for free will then centre on the origin of this intention and the necessary consciousness of the mind. Without these elements, you do not have action so the question of free will becomes irrelevant.

Some people (notably Richard Dawkins and Steven Pinker) argue that consciousness is a product of our biological processes. These processes wholely determine our consciousness and everything within it. As such, we are never free of these processes. Other people argue that consciousness is a divine gift (or something akin to that). We are merely here to enact God's will on the earth.

On the other side, we have people who argue that consciousness is a biological process that can effect itself (if I remember rightly, Searle gives an argument along these lines; and I think Daniel Dennett might as well). Basically, the argument is that simple cause and effect relationships are a poor explanation for what goes on in the brain/mind. There is a notion of a non-event causation between the physical brain and the consciousness -- consciousness is an emergent property of the brain, in the same way that liquidity is an emergent property of water molecules. One cannot ascribe 'liquidity' to one water molecule, but can ascribe it to water in a jug.

Whether or not God exists is neither here nor there. At least I have not seen any conclusive evidence that he´s here or there ;-)

So the godly vantage point for assessing free will is a bit of a cul-de-sac & we´re left with this all too human vantage point. From that lowly point of view it is all fine & well to have highfalutin´ discussions but as long as it isn't humanly possible to predict all details, or to reduce each decision with hindsight to an conclusive causes - this is all just escapism.

One need not refer to debatable "emergent" properties to put free will & biological determinism together. It is, unless proven otherwise, possible to be biologically determined without being fully predictable & as long as there are influences on my biology that are external to my biology it will be very hard to prove that I'm fully predictable - as long as I'm not fully predictable I have free will as far as it's humanly possible to determine.

[Geoff332]

It is, unless proven otherwise, possible to be biologically determined without being fully predictable & as long as there are influences on my biology that are external to my biology it will be very hard to prove that I'm fully predictable - as long as I'm not fully predictable I have free will as far as it's humanly possible to determine.

Doesn't unpredictability -- combined with biological determinism -- suggest behaviour is random rather than intentional?

I'm not saying Searle is definitely right, but to me "free will" implies that our intentions (and the consciousness that produces them) are deliberate, controlled but not biologically determined. How does unpredictability/determinism achieve this?

Unpredictable does not imply random or unintentional.

It merely implies that it´s not possible for you to predict my actions nor for me to predict yours. The reason for that could be that my actions are random or it could be that my actions are governed by an intention that can´t be fully reduced to the outside factors available to you to predict my behaviour.

Now, statistically, there´s no evidence that most of human action is random albeit some might well be random. Rather, most human action - specifically the so called products of conscious reflection - is, statistically, perceived as intentional. Hence, I would rather put the burden of evidence on equating impredictable with random.

I am not saying that one can be conclusive on any of this. I am only saying it is of very limited value to go beyond this to construct a notion equally inconclusive, but with much more assumptions.

By the way, intuitively I think many people would see survival value of avoiding a fully predictable behaviour. Most would also intuitively agree that random action is less open to optimization as intentional action. Therefore, something as free will is most definitely a candidate to survive evolution.

I see no contradiction with biological determinism. If our biology evolved in such a way as to endow us with the capacity to construct a "judgment machine" that while fully intentional is impenetrable by other creatures, there would be no beter words for that "judgment machine" than "free will".

GuidoNius

[Geoff332]

Rather, most human action - specifically the so called products of conscious reflection - is, statistically, perceived as intentional.

Searle (and others) make a distinction between intention in action and prior intention. What you call the products of conscious reflection sounds a lot like prior intention. Basically, we decide to do something, then we do it. But action can also involve intention in action -- the intention is formed as me start the physical movement: the two happen simultaneously. I get the impression you're using the common meaning of 'intention', rather than the technical meaning of 'intention' in philosophy (if I'm wrong, let me know). Either way, the idea that we have to think before we act is not required by Searle's arguments. Intention refers to thinking about the external world -- whether this occurs before or during action is not critical for the existence of will.

it could be that my actions are governed by an intention that can´t be fully reduced to the outside factors available to you to predict my behaviour.

I think we're talking at cross purposes here. There are two forms of determinism (at least, but let's stick with two).

1. Our actions are determined by external forces -- God, the environment or some other external 'thing'.
2. Our actions are determined by internal forces -- the physical biology of our brain.

People like Richard Dawkins argue that our behaviour is fully determined by a combination of these two forces (excluding God, in his case).

What I am talking about is the latter -- internal biological determinism. That is, our actions are fully, completely and without intent determined by what goes on inside our brain. I don't think this is the case, but I want to try and understand why not.

I see a contradiction when you argue that the 'judgement machine' is fully biologically determined. If this is true, then it can only arrive at one 'judgement' for a given experience -- because this judgement machine is determined by your biology. That I might come up with a different judgement from you does not make it any less determined by our biology. If it is not fully biologically determined, then what is the source of the difference?

I'm not trying to disagree with you for the sake of it, I genuinely don't understand this problem; I realise that Searle's explanation is flawed as well. You might have a better explanation, so I'm poking at it to make sure I understand it properly.

[Impenitent]

1. time- time is a human invention (remember your Kant)
2. if there is no free will then there is no moral responsibility

Geoff,

Whenever I use a word I use its common use, otherwise I´ll highlight a specific technical use. There are far too many technical uses of words. It has become an industry of words & the less one needs specific uses, the clearer one can communicate the point.

As to which type of intention, I do not think it matters. As to actions that are made without prior conscious reflection, I do not think it matters. As long as there are some impredictable actions after conscious reflection - my argument stands.

I´m not sure what you´re trying to say before the 2nd quote but surely for free will to be it is critical that free will is a cause of action. Whether or not one freely thinks about actions, without consequences, is neither here nor there since there´s no trace by definition of that free will in a reality external to that free will.

On your point after the 2nd quote, I believe you misread Dawkins. As a spider evolves its evolution will be impacted by a kind of web it weaves & vice versa. We may well be biologically determined to have an ability for language but once that ability has been realized our evolution will be impacted by language. The latter evolution is no longer determined by a biological determination as the language-ability was - because language is now a part of the environment that shapes the biological evolution.

Now, I know this is a proxy point, because there is only a little genetic evolution that could have taken place because of language. But still, it goes to show how something can be biologically determined at a same time as being impredictable from a pure biological point of view. That, I believe, was Dawkins major point in both mimetic evolution & extended phenotype.

Nice talking to you.

GuidoNius

[Geoff332]

OK. The confusion re: intention is easy to understand.

Consciousness requires that the mind be directed to external events -- this is the philosophical meaning of intention. One form of this intention is the common language meaning of intention -- to decide to do something then to do it. Consciousness requires the former, but not the latter -- our minds must be able to be directed towards our actions; but it does not necessarily require that our mind determines our actions.

On the second point, I think Dawkins is not entirely clear (either that or he's changed his mind and I've messed up the timeline). Language is a good example to work with. We have the genetic raw material to speak -- giving us a brain, vocal cords and so forth. When we speak, there are biochemical processes going on inside our bodies that move muscles, producing sound. The material-reductive model of consciousness similarly argues that there are biochemical processes going on in our brains that produce the cognitive processes that go along with thought. This produces three possible (but not exclusive) arguments:
1. These bichemical processes are determined by their own laws and by external material influences.
2. These biochemical processes influence themselves.
3. These biochemical processes are influenced by some other entity.

As I see it, only argument 3 allows for free will. The first means our behaviour (and our thinking) is fully determined by a combination of the biochemical process in our brain and the environment. The second collapses to the first -- how do these processes influence themselves? By acting according to their laws or the external environment -- which still has some form of determinism at its heart.

In the third, you have all the possibility of free will. This external entity could be a dualist notion of 'mind'; it could be a materialist notion of mind (al la Searle or Dennett); it could be God, aliens or the little voices or whatever. Dawkins tends to argue for the first two, which is why i argue he's essentially arguing against free-will.

<edit>
I just realised that some of the examples I gave in the third argument were actually deterministic. That third argument opens the door for the possibility of free will -- but does not guarantee it. There is always a degree of circularity in the reasoning -- the homocumulus problem that Dennett loves to talk about so much; what causes the 'mind' that has free will? That might be the toughest question to answer.
</edit>

Geoff,

On your first paragraph, I do not understand it but I suppose that we´re in the clear on the basic stuff. By the way I´m one of those rare Jaynes fanatics so if you like to go onto consciousness - beware of getting all of that.

On the rest, let me repeat my earlier point: the only vantage point from which we can assess free will is the human vantage point - whether it is possible by thought experiment to construct some Thing that could have a full reduction to biochemical process is immaterial. The fact is that we as humans are not able to reduce everything to biochemical processes, and the litterature for denying us this capability categorically outweighs by far the litterature giving any credibility to thought experiments such as the ones you refer to of Searle & Dennett.

Let me take your:

"3. These biochemical processes are influenced by some other entity."

You seem to imply that that other entity is of necessity immaterial. But, I do not see why it should be. Assume that one selects randomly a ball with a number on it out of a series of 10 balls. Then one stores it, with no knowledge of the number, for later use in a game. At a certain point in time one needs to select an action out of 10 possible actions & this is done by looking up the number on the ball.

Surely, in this case there´s nothing immaterial involved. Surely, action is controlled by an entity outside of the control of the game played. The fact that that entity is in this case chance does not take away its value, in argueing for free will.

Indeed, as long as biochemically one stores a certain value that lateron is used in a biochemical environment that does not impact that value, & one decides to judge based on many things including that value one has free will, imho. It is enough that one stores with intention & re-uses with intention whilst there´s no humanmy possible way to predict how such a thing gets stored & whether or not it is being retrieved.

I read mimetic & extended phenotype Dawkins in that way - language is giving us ways to store biochemically information that is, biochemically, impossible to predict. That´s the difference between mimetic & genetic determination. Not a soul or a God but just a biochemical fact that leads to a biochemical indeterminism. A bit like the spider & its web.

GuidoNius

[Geoff332]

You seem to imply that that other entity is of necessity immaterial.

I said specifically that the 'other entity' could be "a materialist notion of mind" -- there was no pressumption of dualism there.