Philosophy Of Mind

[Geoff332]

Probably the most significant area of contemporary philosophy is looking at the philosophy of mind. the Dictionary of the Philosophy of Mind tell us that the philsophy of mind is:

The branch of philosophy that is concerned with the nature of mental phenomena in general and the role of consciousness, sensation, perception, concepts, action, reasoning, intention, belief, memory, etc. in particular. Standard problems include those of free will, personal identity, mind-body problem, other minds, computationalism, etc.

see full discussion

The philosophy of mind is basically about the nature of the human person -- the standard problems are very important questions about what makes us human (or inhuman). It is a part of the interdisciplinary effort known as cognitive science -- which incorporates philosophy of mind with cognitive psychology, artificial intelligence, neuro-sciences and bits and pieces from most of the other behavioural sciences. Notions of philosophy of mind have been constant themes in most major philosophical systems right back to Socrates (well, everything goes back to Socrates). One of my favourite Socratic dialogues talks about man being in a cave, and rather than perceiving reality directly, all we see are shadows cast on the wall. This hits at the role of perception and our ability to apprehend reality (of course, Socrates puts is far better than I have). Other highlights were Kant's magnum opus, which really centred around the philosophy of mind (a topic which more than any other tracks the development of Kant's thinking over his career).

One of the central debates over the last 20 years is the mind-body problem. The mind body problem is usually traced to Descarte, although it really goes back to a disagreement between Plato and Aristotle. The relationship between the mind and the body has always been problematic. There are essentially two answers.

The dualist view is that the body and the mind are seperate (this was Descarte's basic contribution; and Plato's view; it can be found in most philosophical systems, such as Hume, Kant, Heidegger, and Russell). In the dualist view, the mind has no material base. The mind is some how seperate from the body (from matter). The central problem of dualism is explaining how body and mind interact -- what is the relationship between the two. Descartes talks about the body being an automaton controlled by the mind. Kant gives us a very nice framework of embodied cognition. The main implication of this view is that understanding the brain may not be sufficient to understand the mind.

The materialist view argues that there is nothing beyond the physical world (it is a metaphysical position; not merely epistemological). This was really established by Aristotle, and continued by most of the contemporary philosophers of mind: Searle, Churchland, Rorty, Putnam, Fodor et al). Cartesian materialism means that material means spatial -- ie exists in three dimensional space. There are some problems with this view (which end up on a circular argument). There are different species of materialism, but they all tend to argue that mind (specifically, consciousness) has a material base. The core problem is the explanation of consciousness. They have on their side the a pretty heavy weight of neurological evidence, but still haven't cracked the problem of consciousness (there are some pretty good efforts: Searle, for example).

One of the issues that I want to raise is that popular belief tends towards a dualist view (the consciousness and mind are not fully reducable to the brain); philosophical belief tends towards materialism. But the philosophical notion of materialism has been largely unable to empirically address the critical issues of consciousness -- most obviously in the field of AI.

[G. Adams]

*fumes* it's plato's analogy of the cave, as it his works that the cave story is told. Again, without having any works of his own, nothing can be claimed to be Socrates works. Although Socrates may have taught Plato this story, but we do not know for sure, and this means it is Plato's story, repeated through his Socrates character. I would not claim Doestoyevskies existential writings to be Isac Karamazov, because he is only a character.

[G. Adams]

But now my proper reply. I'd fall in the idealism category, that I notice you missed. It's famous historical espousers are Buckley (or is it Berkley?), plus Siddharta Gautema, the first known buddha.
If we are being serious, then we cannot accept that anything beyond the confines of our own thoughts to be real. The world around me is just a perception, that may be real or not, and I can never know for sure which.

Dualism theory is weak, in that we cannot know for sure, as I have said, that the body aspect is real, merely perceptions of our mind. That does not mean dualism is not correct, rather that implying anything is real beyond our own thoughts is on inherently shaky grounds. The same goes for materialism, though it extends the uncertain ground that dualism stands on.

[Geoff332]

Yes, everything we have from Socrates was written by Plato. We do, however, know that Socrates was a real person. Common (informed) opinion is that the early dialogues in particular were fairly accurate reports of Socrates teachings -- the later we are less clear about. The common parlance is to refer to the Socratic dialogues (which I did; except when I said that Socrates put it better) and to Socrates stories to seperate them from the works of Plato as himself -- which is very useful to highlight the rather significant differences between the two streams of thought. The analogy of Socrates to Karamazov is misleading, Karamazov was a purely fictional character; Socrates was not.

(And if you really want to be technical about it, then I would have to point out it's an allegory, not an analogy)

[G. Adams]

Originally posted by Geoff332@Sep 3 2003, 08:27 PM Yes, everything we have from Socrates was written by Plato. We do, however, know that Socrates was a real person. Common (informed) opinion is that the early dialogues in particular were fairly accurate reports of Socrates teachings -- the later we are less clear about. The common parlance is to refer to the Socratic dialogues (which I did; except when I said that Socrates put it better) and to Socrates stories to seperate them from the works of Plato as himself -- which is very useful to highlight the rather significant differences between the two streams of thought. The analogy of Socrates to Karamazov is misleading, Karamazov was a purely fictional character; Socrates was not. (And if you really want to be technical about it, then I would have to point out it's an allegory, not an analogy)

I know Socrates was real, but to the best of my knowledge (an a-level in philosophy an ethics, got a B) there is nothing solid for what is Socrates own stuff within Plato's works. It is entirely possible that Plato is using him to strengthen his own works within the philisophical community.

My comparison to Karamazov is that the philosophy is only that of the character, it cannot be proved any further.

And I'm not that picky over my words when I'm ranting.

[Geoff332]

To the best of my knowledge (Ph.D in cognitive related stuff), what I wrote was correct. Neither do we know with any certainty that Plato's work was written by one author -- it may have been shared work by many authors. 'Plato' may have been the honourific for a student of Socrates. We simply don't know. With Karamazov, we do know it was a character. That's a pretty significant difference (in court, for example, one would get you convicted, the other would not).

As I said, the common opinion is that Socrates was a real person, and he taught Plato (this is pretty widely accepted; there are a lot of sources other than Plato that confirm the life of Socrates and his role as a teacher). Plato wrote down some of what Socrates said, and then began to modify it before writing his own ideas down. There are rather distinct sylistic differences in the language between the socratic dialogues and Plato's own writing, while displaying startling internal consistency in style, and the ideas are consonant with other writings (Xenophon and Aristophanes, primarily). This indicates a single source. It does change over the course of the dialogues (as I said, the earlier ones are almost certainly Socrates; the latter are less obvious).

This is really a secondary, and largely unimportant argument. The most important point is that the philosophical ideas of the Socrates' character and of Plato are quite distinct, and both have their own strengths and weaknesses.

[G. Adams]

huh, I never considered that Plato could have been a group rather than a single person. That expands that.

Lets get back on topic rather than poking holes in my two years of philosophy.

[Geoff332]

I never considered that Plato could have been a group rather than a single person.

To my knowledge, there's no evidence to support that view, and I certainly don't believe it -- it was just thrown in to make a point: we don't really know what happened 2500 years ago, so we could argue forever about it and not resolve anything.

[Impenitent]

1. Kant ultimately agrees with Hume... by means of a faculty...
(Knowledge is nothing but a word game that signifies appearances)
2. As far as dualism (mind/body or soul/body) is considered, the metaphysical entity of mind or soul or what have you cannot be empirically proven... at best it is a hoped for seperation from the physical body which is not founded in the senses...
3. Inductive reasoning is unreasonable
4. Unsensed and unsensable events are highly suspect...
5. the problems in AI only illustrate our inability to map almost immeasurable amounts of synapses and the like in the human brain and successfully transfer them to an artifical device... smaller functioning machines can be made... one task built upon another task upon another ect. but eventually we will create the apparatus for the machine to spring to cognition...

[Geoff332]

the problems in AI only illustrate our inability to map almost immeasurable amounts of synapses and the like in the human brain and successfully transfer them to an artifical device... smaller functioning machines can be made... one task built upon another task upon another ect. but eventually we will create the apparatus for the machine to spring to cognition...

But we do not, to my knowledge, even vaguely understand the relationship between the physical brain and consciousness. There are hypotheses -- and some of these are quite good ones, but we are not even close.

The current lack of results from AI could indicate that we have simply not understood how the brain creates consciousness. But it could also indicate that the brain does not create consciousness. As you rightly noted, the dualist notion of 'mind' cannot be approached materially/empirically (by definition); but this doesn't mean that it's wrong -- merely that it's inaccessible to empirical demonstration. If some form of dualism is in fact correct, then AI is unlikely to succeed. Without AI succeeding, this cannot be proven (if AI does succeed, then it would go a long way to refuting dualist arguments -- which was the point I wanted to make).

Inductive reasoning may be unreasonable, but wouldn't a better description be uncertain?

[Impenitent]

agreed, the current lack of results are an indication that AI is approaching the problem in the wrong direction... the expectation of a fully functioning "mind" all at once at this stage is not reasonable... give it time, we will make one... one step/function at a time...

uncertain? not really... Hume showed that inductive reasoning was based on an error not an uncertainity...

[Fallen Angel]

I believe in the dualist theory, the mind or soul guides the body through life, and can seperate itself from the body when you are under suffering extreme physical pain.
The body can act out sometimes on its own inniative overiding the mind in a quicker than thought process ,called a reflex.
However the mind must train the body to do this first.

[Geoff332]

I know two definitions of induction/deduction. The 'classical' definition is that induction is reasoning from specific to general; deduction reasoning from general to specific. The 'contemporary' definition is that with deduction the premises guarantee that the is true; induction means the premises probably lead to the conclusion. (And, yes, under the contemporary definition, mathematical induction is actually deductive. Very confusing).

So, an argument such as "Every October we have one strong nor-west gale, therefore this October we will have a strong nor-west gale" is inductive, even though it is reasoning from general to specific.

Hume showed that reasoning from 'impression to idea' was essentially circular, based on custom rather than reason. Hume also talks about other forms of inductive arguments (from cause or effects and concerning matter of fact), and does not reach the same skeptical conclusion. What his argument really meant was that reasoning from 'impression to idea' could not be deductively proved (he uses his idea of a demonstrative argument -- which is a valid argument resting on necessarily tue premises).

None of this argument says that induction is false. It merely says that we are not reasonably required to accept deductive conclusions. This is what has led to the newer formulation of what induction means -- by saying that inductive arguments are focused on likelihood, rather than certainty, Hume's skeptism is incorporated into the definition.

In the context of this debate, it means that AI does not (and cannot) prove that consciousness is material or that the mind is based on duality. But if the current failures continue over a significant period of time, it lends more weight to the argument for duality. If there are significant breakthroughs, then it would prove that consciousness can emerge from material base -- but not that it must emerge from a material base.

[Impenitent]

-Hume showed that reasoning from 'impression to idea' was essentially circular, based on custom rather than reason.

and in the circularity lies the error... but agreed, it is a habit...

-What his argument really meant was that reasoning from 'impression to idea' could not be deductively proved

no, his argument showed that there was no necessary connection between events...

-None of this argument says that induction is false.

Hume's argument claims that induction is an error in reasoning... it seems one wants to try to base a form of epistemology on an error... "newer" formulation of likelihood? I know this and such... er well I kinda have absolute certainity that .... well if the "cards" line up right, I "know" this but ... if Hume's skepticism were actually incorporated into the new inductive arguments there would be no new inductive arguments...

there is no way to know that the bread that nourished me yesterday will nourish me today... remember, there is no rational reason to eat...

the current failures of AI? do you understand how far we have come in a mere 50 years? how long did it take for humans to evolve or whatever? if AI is possible, it will be demonstrated soon... then again depending upon your definition of intelligence, it is already here...

[Geoff332]

What "we've" achieved in the last 50 years is basically doing what an abacus was capable of doing a few thousand years ago. Much faster, to be sure, but still essentially just computational machines. This is all well and good, but not getting us any closer to actually emulating intelligent behaviour. On my definition of intelligence, we're no closer to achieving it aritifically than we were 50 years ago. We still have not come close to actually modelling consciousness -- or even self-awareness. Without them, all you have is a glorified bean counter.

[Impenitent]

have you heard of the Turing test? can an abacus play chess? have you ever heard of a chat bot? have you ever "talked" to a computer? billing or banking via computer? consciousness and self awareness? how do you know that others are self aware? ask them? there is far more to modern computers and programs than counting beans to be sure...

[Geoff332]

The way deep blue plays chess, yes an abacus could do that. Not fast enough to be practical, but conceptually it could.

Computers, including all of the examples you gave, are computational machines (usually variants on the turing machine -- which an abacus if fully able to realise). Whatever you see a computer doing, behind it all is a set of computational routines. If computation is all there is to cognition, then we're getting close -- but I don't think that it is.

[Impenitent]

not at all, an abacus is simply a board with sliding beads... it cannot be programmed to do anything, the technology of an abacus does not even come close... while it is true that a computer is nothing but many series of on and off switches, the sheer numbers of switches/beads and programability of the computer makes it a totally different kind of machine... besides, an abacus cannot talk whereas computers can (at least have the ability to be programmed to "imitate" speech ...)

[Geoff332]

at least have the ability to be programmed to "imitate" speech

If I add to an abacus a list of instructions for how to use it (which is precisely what a computer programme is) and the correct input/output devices (conceptually possible), it would be perfectly capable of doing that. If it had a limit it would be performing the calculationsfast enough -- but this is theoretically possible, even if not practically possible.

The point I am making is this: a computer is merely a computational device. All it can do is computational tasks. Take a Turing machine and add in the basic elements of a von Neuman architecture (memory and I/O), and you have a conceptual framework for what a computer actually is. If that is not the case, why don't you tell me what a computer is, if not a computational machine.

The fact that a computer has a lot more (and a lot faster) ways of computing does not make it anything but a bigger, faster computing machine. No-one who does AI would argue other-wise. They would debate about whether cognition is fundementally and essentially computational; whether it can be successfully modelled on a computational device; and so on.

Are you familiar with Searle's Chinese Room argument?

[Impenitent]

1. If I add to an abacus it is no longer an abacus
2. a computer is a computational machine granted, but computers do far more than simple computations
3. cognition is fundamentally computational
4. yes I am familiar with his room... labeling intentionality is suspect outside of the intending being...