Free will and omniscience

[Walrus]

Quote by: Morality Games For all we know, there could be a being which created this universe (or the multiverse) who isn't omniscient at all, that omniscience is not a requirement to be a Creator anymore than a programmar must understand every detail and nuance of a computer system.

The nature of god is open to speculation, as is his/her/its existence, but as the thread is about an omniscient god, it was to that entity I was referring.

[Fangrim]

3. If such a god's knowledge of the future is not false, then the actions foreseen for you must indeed happen and be unchangeable. In other words, they are not contingent and you are not free to choose otherwise. Expansion on premise 3: It is clear that if a being could see the future actions of everyone, then in order for such a being's knowledge of the future to be accurate, those actions must necessarily happen. They cannot happen otherwise, or else such a being's knowledge would indeed be false and thus we would not consider that being to have omniscience. However, should every action necessarily happen in a certain way, those actions are not contingent--they cannot happen otherwise. This implies that free will is merely an illusion.

I disagree with this premise.

Your premise 3 takes the view that if an omniscient being knows action X will occur, then the action must necessarily occur.
I could easily take the opposite view.

If action X occurs, an omniscient being must necessarily knows that action will occur.

The action does not occur because the being knows it; the being knows it because the action will occur. Thus, one takes an action of one's volition, and the omniscient being knows the action will occur because it will happen.
This removes the contradiction between free will and omniscience.

[ryanatau]

Quote by: Morality Games If humans were gods, what then? We would probably understand fully the physical processes that characterize existence, down to every nuance and detail -- to us the universe would appear as a system without free will, with no contingency, possibility, probability, or anything of the sort. That is the true condition of reality. Our mind would comprehend the systematic nature of things completely.

This supposes that cause and effect are not the instruments or "illusions."

Even with a causal system that does not mean that free will has no place. The causal system, with a subjective actor, can be supposed to have free will. You are assuming that humans behave according to a pre-existent nature. But subjects have to place themselves in the world. How I view the world may very well determine how I act. Regardless, it is my choice, my arrangement of prejudices (to paraphrase James), that create my world order and my determinism.

Also, you suppose that God can perceive the world in a meaningful way. What does it mean for an omnipresent being (assuming God is omnipresent) to perceive?

[Yasa]

Quote by: Fangrim I disagree with this premise. Your premise 3 takes the view that if an omniscient being knows action X will occur, then the action must necessarily occur. I could easily take the opposite view. If action X occurs, an omniscient being must necessarily knows that action will occur. The action does not occur because the being knows it; the being knows it because the action will occur. Thus, one takes an action of one's volition, and the omniscient being knows the action will occur because it will happen. This removes the contradiction between free will and omniscience.

There is no difference in what we are saying. I agree that the action is not causally effected by the knowledge, however I'm saying that due to the knowledge (if it is true) it must necessarily happen a certain way--i.e. no room for other possible outcomes=>no free will.

What you're saying is that the being knows it because it willoccur, i.e. that we don't have free will (because if it will occur, then it's not contingent).

Quote by: Dr_Acula The whole thing is potential. Suppose you have two possibilities, so they both have potential. But what is potential? Ignorance. It refers to what you don't know, and therefore you are uncertain which decision will prevail. But then the decision is made and only one possibility prooved to be really possible, and the other one was never really possible. You just didn't know, you didn't have enough knowledge, so you were forced to say that both had potential. If you knew all the facts, then you would see that only one option will happen.

Indeed. I agree and am to conclude that free will (as described in the OP) only exists due to ignorance. Namely, ignorance of the future.

Quote by: Dr_Acula Yet still, lets not forget that the decision made was the one that prevailed after the individual assesed the situation and choose the course of action that HE decided was most suitable, so in that sense, it was still the will of the individual, free or not.

I agree, however the issue, of course, is whether the will was free (which, as you agreed, it is not).

[Fangrim]

Quote by: Yasa There is no difference in what we are saying. I agree that the action is not causally effected by the knowledge, however I'm saying that due to the knowledge (if it is true) it must necessarily happen a certain way--i.e. no room for other possible outcomes=>no free will. What you're saying is that the being knows it because it willoccur, i.e. that we don't have free will (because if it will occur, then it's not contingent).

The entire point is that the action will only occur because the actor chooses to act.

Yes, if an omniscient being knows an action will occur, that action must occur. It befits the definition of omniscient, since if that action does not occur the being "knew" or believed falsely.

However, the very basis for the being's knowledge that the action will occur is that the action will occur, and in a free will worldview, the action occurs because the actor chooses to act. The only reason that the omniscient being knows the action will occur is because it will occur, and the only reason the action will occur is because of the actor's decision.

I don't see how free will is incompatible with other's knowledge of what one will end up choosing to do.

[Yasa]

Quote by: Fangrim However, the very basis for the being's knowledge that the action will occur is that the action will occur, and in a free will worldview, the action occurs because the actor chooses to act. The only reason that the omniscient being knows the action will occur is because it will occur, and the only reason the action will occur is because of the actor's decision.

As noted in my last post in reply to Dr_Acula, the free will requires ignorance of what will happen. If we knew everything that would happen, nothing would be contingent, and thus, no action would be considered free. By saying that the action will occur means that no other outcome was possible, and therefore, there was no free choice.

Either you have to deny the definition of free will, or accept that knowledge of the future implies no free will.

Another problem is that you're having an action in the present (the knowing of what will happen) be a result of the future. It is a problem to have a being's knowledge at a point in time rely on something that hasn't happened yet. You're trying to get away with saying the future happened before the present so that god's knowledge depends on the future as if it had already happened.

[Fangrim]

Quote by: Yasa free will requires ignorance of what will happen. If we knew everything that would happen, nothing would be contingent, and thus, no action would be considered free. By saying that the action will occur means that no other outcome was possible, and therefore, there was no free choice.

I disagree with the emphasized statement.

In any one instance, some number of actions may be possible, but only one will actually occur. As to which particular action will occur, it would be up to the choice of the actor.

Another problem is that you're having an action in the present (the knowing of what will happen) be a result of the future. It is a problem to have a being's knowledge at a point in time rely on something that hasn't happened yet. You're trying to get away with saying the future happened before the present so that god's knowledge depends on the future as if it had already happened.

My argumentation has nothing to do with time or temporally-related causation. I do not know the mechanics of how this God would know which events occur or whether future events "happen" in the past to be visible for present knowledge, and my arguments do not rely on these mechanics.
Omniscience necessitates that this being knows reality, including all actions that have occurred, are occurring, and will occur.
It has nothing to do with the events having "already happened" in this being's perspective; it's sufficient that this being knows it will happen.


You still aren't showing free will and some other being's knowledge of one's choices to be incompatible, and I do not think that you can. Your premise 3 still contains the non-sequitur; your second statement still does not logically follow the first, and as of yet you have not proven the second statement. It does not logically follow that another's knowledge of which action one takes would eliminate one's choice in taking that action.

[Yasa]

Quote by: Fangrim I disagree with the emphasized statement. In any one instance, some number of actions may be possible, but only one will actually occur. As to which particular action will occur, it would be up to the choice of the actor.

I probably should have said "By knowing 100% that a certain action will occur..."

Quote by: Fangrim You still aren't showing free will and some other being's knowledge of one's choices to be incompatible, and I do not think that you can. Your premise 3 still contains the non-sequitur; your second statement still does not logically follow the first, and as of yet you have not proven the second statement. It does not logically follow that another's knowledge of which action one takes would eliminate one's choice in taking that action.

Given the present, and ignorance of the future, we can conclude that for a choice, there are different possible outcomes. So, I might go for a run, or I might stay in. Since the future has not happened, and both are potential outcomes of the choice, the decision I make is free because it is contingent--it could happen either way. However, if someone knew, ahead of time, what I would choose, then for his knowledge to be true, I would indeed have to choose what that person foresaw. The mere fact that the knowledge of the future exists negates contingency in choices--it makes it just an illusion.

It has to do with time. Let us call a time just before a choice I am about to make time A. Now, at time A, if someone knows the result of what I will choose, time B, then it is not true that at time A my choice could have happened either way. However, if it can not happen either way, it is not contingent, and thus is not a free choice as defined in the OP. The knowledge itself negates the free will because it removes the "can happen either way" required for free will.

[Piscean]

Potentiality, possibility, probability, and capacity reflect more of the nature of the human mind than the nature of reality in general -- in reality, there is only actuality. Potentiality is a ... well, I don't want to say illusion because of my dislike of the term, but for the purposes of this thead, there you go -- because of our creativity, we are able to imagine on basis of the available information that we can do many things, but even this analysis of the possibilities is part of a systematic way of behaving. Ultimately, we are bound to pick just one of the possibilities, and like the activity of analyzing the possibilities itself, this depends on the circumstances pertaining to the deciding agent.

Well said!

[Josh]

Quote by: Fangrim In any one instance, some number of actions may be possible, but only one will actually occur. As to which particular action will occur, it would be up to the choice of the actor.

Would you agree that the actor cannot make a choice before he is aware of it?

[freefallife]

Quote by: Walrus If we accept the argument that god’s omniscience equates to predestination, then this would also apply to god himself, therefore he would not possess freewill and god without freewill would not be god.

God's omniscience does equate to predestination. It is mentioned several times throughout the bible. For example:

Ephesians 1:4-5 For he chose us in him before the creation of the world to be holy and blameless in his sight. In love he predestined us to be adopted as his sons through Jesus Christ, in accordance with his pleasure and will

Ephesians 1:11 In him we were also chosen, having been predestined according to the plan of him who works out everything in conformity with the purpose of his will

In order for a god to predetermine the outcome of every life on the planet, he must be omniscient. He planned out your life. In fact, in adopting an atheistic veiw, I am simply living up to gods plan for my life. My "free" choice of the belief in god was actually predestined before the creation of the world, according to Ephesians 1:4. God has granted you nothing but the illusion of free will. I am of course speaking of free will as the choice between belief and non-belief, to sin or not to sin, not merely the choice of what shirt to wear this morning.

[Josh]

Sorry to drag the thread back up, but I just want to add that the concept of omniscience holds ramifications not only for human's free will, but also for god's free will and his omnipotence.

To be truly omniscient, it isn't enough for god to know merely what you or I will be doing in the future, he must also know what he will be doing in the future. This raises the question, can god escape doing what he sees himself doing? Because if at any point god cannot escape what he sees in the future, he loses his omnipotence and free will. If he can, he loses his omniscience.

So a god that is both omniscient and omnipotent is contradictory.

[ryanatau]

Quote by: Josh Sorry to drag the thread back up, but I just want to add that the concept of omniscience holds ramifications not only for human's free will, but also for god's free will and his omnipotence. To be truly omniscient, it isn't enough for god to know merely what you or I will be doing in the future, he must also know what he will be doing in the future. This raises the question, can god escape doing what he sees himself doing? Because if at any point god cannot escape what he sees in the future, he loses his omnipotence and free will. If he can, he loses his omniscience. So a god that is both omniscient and omnipotent is contradictory.

Not if God is eternal and not within time (e.g. Boethius in Consolations of Philosophy Book V: "eternity is the complete possession of an endless line enjoyed as one simultaneous whole").

[Josh]

Quote by: ryanatau Not if God is eternal and not within time.

True, but it's a fairly simple matter to reconstruct the argument to make it atemporal.

Can god do or cause that which contradicts his infallible knowledge? Because if god cannot do or cause that which contradicts his knowledge, he loses his omnipotence and free will. If he can, he loses his omniscience.

[Morality Games]

So a god that is both omniscient and omnipotent is contradictory.

Not if it's existence transcends space-time, although the idea of a being existing outside space-time contradicts the standard meaning of the term 'existence'.

But what is God except one contradictory idea after the other? What is God other than that?

The action does not occur because the being knows it; the being knows it because the action will occur. Thus, one takes an action of one's volition, and the omniscient being knows the action will occur because it will happen. This removes the contradiction between free will and omniscience.

You seem determined not to think seriously about the dilemma. Perhaps you are incapable, or just don't want to. Anyway, God's role as first cause and his omnipotence plays into this just as much as his omniscience. If God knows all, is the cause of all, and is all powerful, then how does he escape responsibility and accountability for everything that occurs? No amount of theological reasoning has ever put more than a band-aid on this problem -- moreover, all theological reasoning can do (as you have done) is throw dust in people's eyes whenever they get close to spotting how distorted theological concepts of God are.

This supposes that cause and effect are not the instruments or "illusions."

Not really, it just doesn't make note of it.

Even with a causal system that does not mean that free will has no place.

So you are arguing for compatibilism. There are no serious disagreements between us then, except that compatibilism is unnecessarily wordy and easily induces false impressions.

The causal system, with a subjective actor, can be supposed to have free will. You are assuming that humans behave according to a pre-existent nature. But subjects have to place themselves in the world. How I view the world may very well determine how I act. Regardless, it is my choice, my arrangement of prejudices (to paraphrase James), that create my world order and my determinism.

Your argument seems to be, "Because there is an I, my will is free" -- this kind of thinking is pretty representational of compatibilism in general.

Also, you suppose that God can perceive the world in a meaningful way. What does it mean for an omnipresent being (assuming God is omnipresent) to perceive?

Everything at once in every mode possible; they would perceive the whole of actuality in the manner of every existing entity, so in colors (like humans), not in colors and smell-centric (like dogs), sound-centric (like bats), as statistical data (like computers), and more -- there would also be a mode of thought possible only to God, one that no entity other than God could use, and one of course that is incomprehensible to everyone else (and thus one I cannot describe, I can only say that, logically, it should exist).

But this concept of God is a fusion between deistic and pantheistic ideas -- a pantheistic God might not think in a mode beyond that of all entities in nature and a deistic God might not think in any mode except one inaccessible to other entities.

[ryanatau]

Quote by: Morality Games Not if it's existence transcends space-time, although the idea of a being existing outside space-time contradicts the standard meaning of the term 'existence'.

How is that? Many philosophers have contended anything that transcends space-time has more being (e.g. Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, Augustine, Kant, ect.)

But what is God except one contradictory idea after the other? What is God other than that?

I cant believe how many Medieval philosophers I have been appealing to lately, but John Scottus Eriugena (through the Pseudo-Dionysus) would say that these conceptions of God only contradict because we are using the positive way instead of the negative way.

You seem determined not to think seriously about the dilemma. Perhaps you are incapable, or just don't want to. Anyway, God's role as first cause and his omnipotence plays into this just as much as his omniscience. If God knows all, is the cause of all, and is all powerful, then how does he escape responsibility and accountability for everything that occurs? No amount of theological reasoning has ever put more than a band-aid on this problem -- moreover, all theological reasoning can do (as you have done) is throw dust in people's eyes whenever they get close to spotting how distorted theological concepts of God are.

I don't know I think theology has done an ok job solving the Problem of evil. I mean it is not wholly convincing but it is not all that bad. Augustine's evil as privation is good.

So you are arguing for compatibilism. There are no serious disagreements between us then, except that compatibilism is unnecessarily wordy and easily induces false impressions.

You could say I am arguing for compatiblism. But really I am just arguing that there are other perspectives. I wouldn't necessarily make the leap.

Your argument seems to be, "Because there is an I, my will is free" -- this kind of thinking is pretty representational of compatibilism in general.

I wouldn't simplify it to that because of problems that would immediately occur because of the vague concept of "I" and self-consciousness. It would not help we would just dive into the philosophy of mind, then philosophy of language, etc.

Everything at once in every mode possible; they would perceive the whole of actuality in the manner of every existing entity, so in colors (like humans), not in colors and smell-centric (like dogs), sound-centric (like bats), as statistical data (like computers), and more -- there would also be a mode of thought possible only to God, one that no entity other than God could use, and one of course that is incomprehensible to everyone else (and thus one I cannot describe, I can only say that, logically, it should exist).

Would you actually call this perceiving? If God understands in on insightful whole (without use of imagination or sense) is that perception? Are a priori judgments perceptions? I would say no. I think this kind of Godly understanding is placed above pure reason (given a Hegelian hierarchy of reason).

But this concept of God is a fusion between deistic and pantheistic ideas -- a pantheistic God might not think in a mode beyond that of all entities in nature and a deistic God might not think in any mode except one inaccessible to other entities.

A Pantheistic God may not think at all. Who was it that came up with the pantheistic God as Aristotle's substratum?

[ryanatau]

Quote by: Josh True, but it's a fairly simple matter to reconstruct the argument to make it atemporal. Can god do or cause that which contradicts his infallible knowledge? Because if god cannot do or cause that which contradicts his knowledge, he loses his omnipotence and free will. If he can, he loses his omniscience.

What would Kierkegaard say to this?

I think some one like Augustine would say that God can only will the Good. He cannot will other than what he wills not because of lack of power but because any other will other than his is lacks perfection; since the un-perfect has no existence (it is a privation) God can do anything that it wills (since whatever it does not will does not exist). Its not entirely convincing, i know, but that is all I can think of right now. That is why I put the Kierkegaard reference at the top. Kierkegaard is like a get out of jail free card.

I guess another way out is to say, like Platinus, that nothing can be predicated of God. I think that probably is the best solution because the Augustinian one I don't think is valid (and I don't think Augustine would actually say what I said he would say) but I'll post it any way.

I think the question is difficult because you are basically asking can God take way His eternal being. (I know this is not at all how you worded it but I think it follows from what you said.)

[Morality Games]

How is that? Many philosophers have contended anything that transcends space-time has more being (e.g. Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, Augustine, Kant, ect.)

Terms like 'existence' were initially developed and employed for the sake of describing the tangible realities of the everyday world, or empirical processes. 'Existence', or whatever ancient utterances equate with it, meant 'world', or the 'particulars that comprise the world', and nothing else. This remains the typical meaning of 'existence' and like terms in ordinary conversation. However, the discourse has been polluted somewhat by the idea that existence can refer to things outside the world too, although there is no firm scientific basis that this should be the case (that there are realities outside the world).

[ryanatau]

Quote by: Morality Games Terms like 'existence' were initially developed and employed for the sake of describing the tangible realities of the everyday world, or empirical processes. 'Existence', or whatever ancient utterances equate with it, meant 'world', or the 'particulars that comprise the world', and nothing else. This remains the typical meaning of 'existence' and like terms in ordinary conversation. However, the discourse has been polluted somewhat by the idea that existence can refer to things outside the world too, although there is no firm scientific basis that this should be the case (that there are realities outside the world).

"Existence" may have been originally used to describe material reality but that is only because pre-plato no one thought of transcendent idealistic reality (with the exception of Anaxagoras' Nous but I would hardly call it a worked out non-material entity). You seem to be saying that existence and cosmos are the same.

It seems to me the typical use of the word existence means that the objects has being.

[ryanatau]

In latin existence (existere) simple means a being (ens) is capable of receiving an essence. Since God, especially in early latin thought, is pure being (esse purissimum) it also has existence (existere) the ability to realize essence.