Naturalisms Aversion of the A Priori, Analycity and the Necessary

[agustine]

The three concepts provided within the title of this thread pertain to three distinct paradigms within philosophy. The first is epistemic. The second is logical and the third is metaphysical. Naturalists have an overt tendency to treat any notions of a priori knowledge, logical analycity and metaphysical necessity with contempt. Now, I reject these tendencies however I recognize that if certain propositions exist that are in point of fact known to us a priori, are logically analytic and metaphysically necessary, such notions are inherently incompatible with a naturalistic world-view. For how would one account for their ontological status. These ideas, as expounded by Leibnitz, Decartes, Kant and others are quite unsettling to the hard empiricist. However, I find compelling reasons to believe that these concepts as valid. I would nevertheless invite comments....

Augustine

[Osborn F Enready]

What is your definition of valid?

Do you think validity of one rules out the others, or are multiple theories within the realm of being correct simultaneously, in your opinion?

Do you have your own theory, or does a published author share your view?

[agustine]

To Osborn F Enready. With respect to your comment

What is your definition of valid?

I am speaking epistemologically. Epistemology is a theory of knowledge and justified true belief. Within Epistemology, philosophers employ certain conventions relative to the use of language when qualifying a particular proposition or belief. Here, "validity" is actually a predicate of the subject "concept". With respect to your comment

Do you think validity of one rules out the others, or are multiple theories within the realm of being correct simultaneously, in your opinion?

I do not think I understand the question.

Thank you

Augustine

[Osborn F Enready]

Augustine said: I do not think I understand the question.

I am in the same boat, and Iwas hoping for more elaboration as to the original posts claims or objections.

I don't think I understand exactly what your question is, in the title post of the thread.

[agustine]

To Osborn F Enready. Do you possess a background in philosophy? If so, then the question should be readily apparent.

Augustine

[Jack]

I have to suspect you're not getting any debate on the topic you present simply because your language is so lofty and specific to institutional philosophy that no one knows what you're trying to say or wish to debate.

This was mentioned in another thread a while ago. Language becomes useless if it fails to convey the message you want to get across to others.

I don't mean to be insulting at all. I do wish to offer constructive criticism by saying that perhaps if you expressed yourself in words that the others here can comprehend, then you may find them more able to debate. Otherwise you'll wind up just talking to yourself. You have a fine command of the language. Unfortunately, it's being wasted here by not being able to convey your thoughts to the rest of us.

[Osborn F Enready]

My thoughts exactly, and well said Ish.

One of the reasons I posted, was because I didn't think this thread would get much, if any response. (can't call me a threadkiller in this one... )

I am interested in the topic, if I am reading what I can decipher from the original post correctly.

[agustine]

To Isherwood & Osborn F Enready. Thank you for your comments. Well said.... I got the idea for this thread from the debate on moral relativism. I argued for certain moral absolutes known a priori but there appeared to be a considerable degree of confusioin regarding a priori knowledge. I though the exchange would be of some value. Nevertheless, point well-taken. I have posted a new thread entitled "Is the Evidentialist Objection to Theistic Belief Rational..." I would invite your comments.

Augustine

[pikatore]

Since I'm such an honest guy, I will not even try to pretend that I have a clue of what the OP is. Is there a way to bring this to a layman's level?