| RingingSword : "If the progression from what is known to what logically follows can be conceived of as a phenomenon of movement, i.e. as a journey, then logic, in general, can be conceived of as a set of guidelines for movement from one specifiable point to another."
pan : I like it, but what distinguishes the map, or as you put it, the "set of guidelines for movement from one specifiable point to another", from the "journey"?
RingingSword : "The symbolic movement of logical notation corresponds with the phenomenal movement of physical objects."
pan : Interesting. From this it follows that no phenomenal movement of physical objects can fly in the face of logic. Hey, isn't this already the case?
RingingSword : "Prop 4 – When we conceive of something logically impossible, we situate the set (range) of known possible movements within a larger, transcendent context, which context contains types of movement whose specificity and practical implementation (as viewed from the pre-transcendent context) are unknown.
pan : Here I take issue with your reasoning. Positing the undiscovered as "logical impossibilities" would be to employ a category error.
The lack of awareness of an available avenue doesn't negate its availability. We are free (as it were) to discover it, or to stumble onto it quite by accident.
Certainly, such an undiscovered avenue should never be categorized as a "logical impossibility".
Further, the common notion of transcendence doesn't quite taste right in the context of the dish you've served.
From your view, what is transcended in the discovery of the previously unknown? Knowledge itself?!
RingingSword : "Prop 5 – logical impossibility is only absolute within a specified context. Even so, such specification is self-contradictory because the assertion of logical impossibility implies the existence of a transcendent context wherein the specific and practical implementation of the (conditionally, i.e. contextually specific) logically impossible movement (from one manifest position to another) is both possible and knowable. Were this not the case, logical impossibility would be inconceivable."
pan : I'd argue that an "impossibility" is absolutely impossible by definition. When what was once felt to be impossible is shown to be possible, the previous feeling is exposed as a falsehood. In such a case the fact falsifies the feeling, and in so doing, sheds light on the faulty categorization.
RingingSword : "Prop 5 Ramifications – by implication, this proposition posits a universe that is phenomenally (and therefore epistemically) open."
pan : I'd say that your proposition posits an "open universe" by means of faulty categorization, and thereby calls into question its own validity.
meden agan |