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Quote by: Fangrim  I disagree with the emphasized statement.
In any one instance, some number of actions may be possible, but only one will actually occur. As to which particular action will occur, it would be up to the choice of the actor. |
I probably should have said "By
knowing 100% that a certain action will occur..."
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Quote by: Fangrim You still aren't showing free will and some other being's knowledge of one's choices to be incompatible, and I do not think that you can. Your premise 3 still contains the non-sequitur; your second statement still does not logically follow the first, and as of yet you have not proven the second statement. It does not logically follow that another's knowledge of which action one takes would eliminate one's choice in taking that action. |
Given the present, and ignorance of the future, we can conclude that for a choice, there are different possible outcomes. So, I might go for a run, or I might stay in. Since the future has not happened, and both are potential outcomes of the choice, the decision I make is free because it is contingent--it could happen either way. However, if someone knew, ahead of time, what I would choose, then for his knowledge to be true, I would indeed have to choose what that person foresaw. The mere fact that the knowledge of the future exists negates contingency in choices--it makes it just an illusion.
It has to do with time. Let us call a time just before a choice I am about to make time A. Now, at time A, if someone knows the result of what I will choose, time B, then it is not true that at time A my choice could have happened either way. However, if it can not happen either way, it is not contingent, and thus is not a free choice as defined in the OP. The knowledge itself negates the free will because it removes the "can happen either way" required for free will.