[Fangrim]

Quote by: Yasa free will requires ignorance of what will happen. If we knew everything that would happen, nothing would be contingent, and thus, no action would be considered free. By saying that the action will occur means that no other outcome was possible, and therefore, there was no free choice.

I disagree with the emphasized statement.

In any one instance, some number of actions may be possible, but only one will actually occur. As to which particular action will occur, it would be up to the choice of the actor.

Another problem is that you're having an action in the present (the knowing of what will happen) be a result of the future. It is a problem to have a being's knowledge at a point in time rely on something that hasn't happened yet. You're trying to get away with saying the future happened before the present so that god's knowledge depends on the future as if it had already happened.

My argumentation has nothing to do with time or temporally-related causation. I do not know the mechanics of how this God would know which events occur or whether future events "happen" in the past to be visible for present knowledge, and my arguments do not rely on these mechanics.
Omniscience necessitates that this being knows reality, including all actions that have occurred, are occurring, and will occur.
It has nothing to do with the events having "already happened" in this being's perspective; it's sufficient that this being knows it will happen.


You still aren't showing free will and some other being's knowledge of one's choices to be incompatible, and I do not think that you can. Your premise 3 still contains the non-sequitur; your second statement still does not logically follow the first, and as of yet you have not proven the second statement. It does not logically follow that another's knowledge of which action one takes would eliminate one's choice in taking that action.