Quote:
3. If such a god's knowledge of the future is not false, then the actions foreseen for you must indeed happen and be unchangeable. In other words, they are not contingent and you are not free to choose otherwise.
Expansion on premise 3:
It is clear that if a being could see the future actions of everyone, then in order for such a being's knowledge of the future to be accurate, those actions must necessarily happen. They cannot happen otherwise, or else such a being's knowledge would indeed be false and thus we would not consider that being to have omniscience. However, should every action necessarily happen in a certain way, those actions are not contingent--they cannot happen otherwise. This implies that free will is merely an illusion.
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I disagree with this premise.
Your premise 3 takes the view that if an omniscient being knows action X will occur, then the action must necessarily occur.
I could easily take the opposite view.
If action X occurs, an omniscient being must necessarily knows that action will occur.
The action does not occur because the being knows it; the being knows it because the action will occur. Thus, one takes an action of one's volition, and the omniscient being knows the action will occur because it will happen.
This removes the contradiction between free will and omniscience.