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Quote by: The Bacon Guy  Right, so we've established that the conclusion doesn't follow from the premises. |
No, I said that if a person
can give, then they should give. If a person
cannot give, then it's not necessarily the case that they should give. But I also said that for most affluent people, this is not the case, as they
can give, and thus should give.
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Quote by: The Bacon Guy Now for the premises themselves. To use my example again, if one dollar alleviates one unit of suffering for a starving African child, but that for a particular rich man, losing one dollar causes 0.75 units of suffering, the rich man should, from your premises, be obligated to give his money away.
But why should this be that case? Why should the rich man be obligated to lower himself into suffering in order to help a complete stranger? |
In your hypothetical example, it seems to be beyond the point of marginal utility for that "rich" man (I have rich in quotations because it is dubious considering the qualms over giving a dollar) to give one dollar because he would get rapidly closer to the sufferers' state with each dollar given. In that case, the "rich" man
cannot give, and is not obligated to give.
However, your example is just that: hypothetical and not an accurate representation of real life. For most affluent, giving a dollar does not go beyond the point of marginal utility that I discussed previously, because they
can give it without much suffering. Setting aside concerns that suffering cannot be quantified, I'll correct your example. While the dollar can alleviate one unit of suffering in the child, it may only cost the more accurate example of the rich man 0.001 unit of suffering. Giving a dollar, or even multiple dollars, would not be beyond the affluent person's capacity, and they would have an obligation to do it.
If you want to question the premises, I suggest you question the concept that can implies ought. If we can stop evil, are we obligated to do so?