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Apr 23, 2004, 05:35 am

From the DailyHowler. Give it some thought.

Last Saturday, the Washington Post published the first overview of Woodward’s new book. William Hamilton ran through the highlights. He described that now-famous briefing:

HAMILTON: Bush wanted someone with Powell’s credibility to present the evidence that Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction [to the UN], a case the president had initially found less than convincing when presented to him by CIA Deputy Director John E. McLaughlin at a White House meeting on Dec. 21, 2002.
McLaughlin’s version used communications intercepts, satellite photos, diagrams and other intelligence. “Nice try,” Bush said when the CIA official was finished, according to [Woodward’s] book. “I don’t think this quite—it’s not something that Joe Public would understand or would gain a lot of confidence from.”

He then turned to Tenet, McLaughlin’s boss, and said, “I’ve been told all this intelligence about having WMD, and this is the best we’ve got?”

“It’s a slam-dunk case,” Tenet replied, throwing his arms in the air. Bush pressed him again. “George, how confident are you?”

“Don’t worry, it’s a slam dunk,” Tenet repeated.

Tenet later told associates he should have said the evidence on weapons was not ironclad, according to Woodward.

Since Saturday, this episode has been discussed again and again. And everyone knows what the episode means—George Tenet blew it again. But no one has raised an obvious question, a question concerning the date of this brief. The question virtually leaps off the page—but everyone knows not to notice.
Readers, why was this briefing given in December 2002? As Woodward’s book makes perfectly clear, this was very late in the game for Bush to be checking the evidence. This ballyhooed briefing is described on pages 247-250 of Plan of Attack. But as the book makes perfectly clear, Bush Admin types—including Bush—had been making unequivocal assertions about WMD for about four months when this briefing occurred. The briefing occurred in December 2002—but Bush and Cheney had been saying “slam dunk” themselves ever since the previous August.

In chapter 18 of Plan of Attack (pages 192-204), Woodward describes the state of intelligence in the summer and fall of 2002. The intelligence community “had a massive amount of intelligence” about WMD, he writes,” “much of it old and not very reliable.” What was the actual state of intelligence? “The real and best answer was that [Saddam] probably had WMD, but that there was no proof and the case was circumstantial,” Woodward writes (his emphasis). Indeed, when he describes the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (the one Condi Rice forgot to finish reading), Woodward says that its conclusions were “speculative” and showed “tentativeness.” (For example, when the NIE addressed the question of whether Saddam might aid al Qaeda, it used “a triple set of qualifiers.”) The NIE featured words like “probably” and “possibly,” Woodward notes. Again—this was the state of US intelligence in the months preceding that December briefing.

But none of this kept Bush Admin figures from making definitive public statements. First up was Cheney, on August 26, 2002—four months before Bush got that briefing:

WOODWARD (page 164): “Cheney Says Peril of a Nuclear Iraq Justifies Attack,” read the headline in the New York Times on Aug. 27. Powell was dumbfounded. The vice president had delivered a hard-line address to the Veterans of Foreign Wars convention in Nashville and basically called weapons inspections futile…
The vice president also issued his own personal National Intelligence Estimate of Hussein: “There is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction [and] there is no doubt that he is amassing them to use against our friends, against our allies and against us.” Ten days earlier, the president himself had said only that Hussein “desires” these weapons. Neither Bush nor the CIA had made any assertion comparable to Cheney’s.

Four months before Bush got that briefing, Cheney made a public statement which vastly exceeded the state of the intelligence. A few weeks later, Bush followed suit. On September 7, Woodward relates, Tony Blair visited Washington:
WOODWARD (page 178): Bush and Blair took questions from reporters. They said they were committed to ending Saddam’s threat once and for all. How or when went unanswered. Bush asserted unequivocally, “Saddam Hussein possesses weapons of mass destruction.”
Bush made this unequivocal public statement four months before that White House briefing. On September 26, he did it again:
WOODWARD (page 189): Repeating the new unequivocal charge about Iraq’s WMD program she had adopted three weeks earlier, Bush said, “The Iraqi regime possesses biological and chemical weapons. The Iraqi regime is building the facilities necessary to make more.” Ratcheting up another notch, he added, “And according to the British government, the Iraqi regime could launch a biological or chemical attack in as little as 45 minutes after the order were given.”
Tenet and the CIA had warned the British not to make that allegation, which was based on a questionable source…Tenet referred privately to this as the “they-can-attack-in-45-minutes-shit.”

By the way, where was Bush’s National Security Adviser while the president was out talking “shit?” She was on Sunday network TV, talking “shit” about intel herself. Condi was swearing that those aluminum tubes could only be used for nuclear weapons—a bogus claim which completely misstated the state of American intel (see THE DAILY HOWLER, 6/24/03).
In short, what’s the striking thing about that December briefing? The fact that it occurred in December! The press corps knows how to play this item: Tenet gave Bush a lousy briefing, and the wise president said to do better. But everyone knows not to mention the obvious. At the time this briefing occurred, Bush and Cheney had already spent four months making flat statements about the intelligence. Why was Bush being briefed in December when his statements had started that fall?

This question would occur to almost anyone—except to the Washington “press corps.” Do you mind if we tell you the truth? Woodward’s book is full of scripts—scripts that flatter a bold, daring president. (Such may be the price of full access.) The December briefing is one such narration. Tenet is the fall guy here, brought up short by an eagle-eyed president. And everyone knows not to ask the obvious: Why was this president making “unequivocal statements” long before this briefing occurred?

Apr 23, 2004, 05:35 am	#6 (permalink) (top)
PeterWolf Guest Posts: n/a	From the DailyHowler. Give it some thought. Last Saturday, the Washington Post published the first overview of Woodward’s new book. William Hamilton ran through the highlights. He described that now-famous briefing: HAMILTON: Bush wanted someone with Powell’s credibility to present the evidence that Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction [to the UN], a case the president had initially found less than convincing when presented to him by CIA Deputy Director John E. McLaughlin at a White House meeting on Dec. 21, 2002. McLaughlin’s version used communications intercepts, satellite photos, diagrams and other intelligence. “Nice try,” Bush said when the CIA official was finished, according to [Woodward’s] book. “I don’t think this quite—it’s not something that Joe Public would understand or would gain a lot of confidence from.” He then turned to Tenet, McLaughlin’s boss, and said, “I’ve been told all this intelligence about having WMD, and this is the best we’ve got?” “It’s a slam-dunk case,” Tenet replied, throwing his arms in the air. Bush pressed him again. “George, how confident are you?” “Don’t worry, it’s a slam dunk,” Tenet repeated. Tenet later told associates he should have said the evidence on weapons was not ironclad, according to Woodward. Since Saturday, this episode has been discussed again and again. And everyone knows what the episode means—George Tenet blew it again. But no one has raised an obvious question, a question concerning the date of this brief. The question virtually leaps off the page—but everyone knows not to notice. Readers, why was this briefing given in December 2002? As Woodward’s book makes perfectly clear, this was very late in the game for Bush to be checking the evidence. This ballyhooed briefing is described on pages 247-250 of Plan of Attack. But as the book makes perfectly clear, Bush Admin types—including Bush—had been making unequivocal assertions about WMD for about four months when this briefing occurred. The briefing occurred in December 2002—but Bush and Cheney had been saying “slam dunk” themselves ever since the previous August. In chapter 18 of Plan of Attack (pages 192-204), Woodward describes the state of intelligence in the summer and fall of 2002. The intelligence community “had a massive amount of intelligence” about WMD, he writes,” “much of it old and not very reliable.” What was the actual state of intelligence? “The real and best answer was that [Saddam] probably had WMD, but that there was no proof and the case was circumstantial,” Woodward writes (his emphasis). Indeed, when he describes the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (the one Condi Rice forgot to finish reading), Woodward says that its conclusions were “speculative” and showed “tentativeness.” (For example, when the NIE addressed the question of whether Saddam might aid al Qaeda, it used “a triple set of qualifiers.”) The NIE featured words like “probably” and “possibly,” Woodward notes. Again—this was the state of US intelligence in the months preceding that December briefing. But none of this kept Bush Admin figures from making definitive public statements. First up was Cheney, on August 26, 2002—four months before Bush got that briefing: WOODWARD (page 164): “Cheney Says Peril of a Nuclear Iraq Justifies Attack,” read the headline in the New York Times on Aug. 27. Powell was dumbfounded. The vice president had delivered a hard-line address to the Veterans of Foreign Wars convention in Nashville and basically called weapons inspections futile… The vice president also issued his own personal National Intelligence Estimate of Hussein: “There is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction [and] there is no doubt that he is amassing them to use against our friends, against our allies and against us.” Ten days earlier, the president himself had said only that Hussein “desires” these weapons. Neither Bush nor the CIA had made any assertion comparable to Cheney’s. Four months before Bush got that briefing, Cheney made a public statement which vastly exceeded the state of the intelligence. A few weeks later, Bush followed suit. On September 7, Woodward relates, Tony Blair visited Washington: WOODWARD (page 178): Bush and Blair took questions from reporters. They said they were committed to ending Saddam’s threat once and for all. How or when went unanswered. Bush asserted unequivocally, “Saddam Hussein possesses weapons of mass destruction.” Bush made this unequivocal public statement four months before that White House briefing. On September 26, he did it again: WOODWARD (page 189): Repeating the new unequivocal charge about Iraq’s WMD program she had adopted three weeks earlier, Bush said, “The Iraqi regime possesses biological and chemical weapons. The Iraqi regime is building the facilities necessary to make more.” Ratcheting up another notch, he added, “And according to the British government, the Iraqi regime could launch a biological or chemical attack in as little as 45 minutes after the order were given.” Tenet and the CIA had warned the British not to make that allegation, which was based on a questionable source…Tenet referred privately to this as the “they-can-attack-in-45-minutes-shit.” By the way, where was Bush’s National Security Adviser while the president was out talking “shit?” She was on Sunday network TV, talking “shit” about intel herself. Condi was swearing that those aluminum tubes could only be used for nuclear weapons—a bogus claim which completely misstated the state of American intel (see THE DAILY HOWLER, 6/24/03). In short, what’s the striking thing about that December briefing? The fact that it occurred in December! The press corps knows how to play this item: Tenet gave Bush a lousy briefing, and the wise president said to do better. But everyone knows not to mention the obvious. At the time this briefing occurred, Bush and Cheney had already spent four months making flat statements about the intelligence. Why was Bush being briefed in December when his statements had started that fall? This question would occur to almost anyone—except to the Washington “press corps.” Do you mind if we tell you the truth? Woodward’s book is full of scripts—scripts that flatter a bold, daring president. (Such may be the price of full access.) The December briefing is one such narration. Tenet is the fall guy here, brought up short by an eagle-eyed president. And everyone knows not to ask the obvious: Why was this president making “unequivocal statements” long before this briefing occurred?