| OK. As I said, I learnt Rawls in business ethics; in business, social contract is generally considered a good thing -- and I find it one of the better political/societal models around, so I tend to be quite happy when a model rests on it.
Rawls came up with two basic principles for justice (derived from behind his veil of ignorance):
1. Each person should have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with similar liberty for others.
2. Social and economic inequalities are to be arranges so that they are:
(a) reasonably expected to be to everyone's advantage;
(b) attached to positions and offices open to all.
It's essentially a theory of distributive justice -- looking at the distribution of benefits and burdens amoung the society. At it's heart, at least in the original formulation, Rawls recognised that individuals have competing interests. The idea of a social contract was that these interests should be rationally negotiated, rather than imposed on people. In many ways, my take on his formulation of social-contract was that it was distinctly not authoritarian and is individualistic. So your criticism strikes me as a little strange. (If you can explain it more, I might better understand where you're coming from).
The most common criticism of Rawls from an individualistic point of view centres on property -- given his 'original position', one can only assume that individual assets can (and, indeed should) be redistrubuted in a just society -- on the basis negotiated by the parties from that position. Put crudely, Rawls recognises the individuality of interests, but not the individuality of property (he also gets criticised for being too individualistic, which just proves that you can't please everyone).
Now, I'm not sure if you used the term 'contractarian' in the precise sense or not. I suspect you did, but bear with me. There are generally two schools of thought on social contracts. Contractualist and contractarian -- reflecting divergence between Hobbes and Locke. Contractarians argue that individuals will agree to and legitimise a contract if they think it serves their own interests; acceptability is the primary criteria. This is argued by people like Gauthier and James Buhcanan.
Rawls is generally considered to be a contractualist. He (and others) argue that agents are the ones who decide the contract; protecting our interest. The notion of the veil of ignorance is the thought-experiment to seperate the individuals from their agents. Because we don't know what position we will take up in society, we are more inclined to derive a society where everyone is justly treated. As I write this, I can see how that does sound anti-individualistic, but the authoratarian idea still escapes me. If you're arguing from a strict individual self-interest basis, then you end with a teleological position (such as rule utilitarianism). Rawls was strongly against this, because there was a lack of a 'public conception of good', which was necessary for teleological reasoning.
I've been told that his revision of A Theory of Justice he moves towards a far more political liberal model, rather than a strictly contractual model -- so this might be the source of our differing opinions. If I've understood what he wrote there, he was advocating a political liberalism that was independent of (and neutral with respect to) differing metaphysical positions. This, of course, upsets everyone who holds a given metaphysical position dear, because they want US to have 'lordship and dominion' over THEM -- which means he probably offended everyone to some extent.
This has been a bit of a random walk through Rawls -- I'm not sure where, exactly, you want to take this. Hopefully there's something here that you can pick up on and we can work on for a bit. |