Thread: Free Will
View Single Post
Old Oct 7, 2003, 06:44 pm   #15 (permalink) (top)
Geoff332
Igneous Magma
 
Location: New Zealand
Posts: 309
Quote:
Rather, most human action - specifically the so called products of conscious reflection - is, statistically, perceived as intentional.
Searle (and others) make a distinction between intention in action and prior intention. What you call the products of conscious reflection sounds a lot like prior intention. Basically, we decide to do something, then we do it. But action can also involve intention in action -- the intention is formed as me start the physical movement: the two happen simultaneously. I get the impression you're using the common meaning of 'intention', rather than the technical meaning of 'intention' in philosophy (if I'm wrong, let me know). Either way, the idea that we have to think before we act is not required by Searle's arguments. Intention refers to thinking about the external world -- whether this occurs before or during action is not critical for the existence of will.

Quote:
it could be that my actions are governed by an intention that canīt be fully reduced to the outside factors available to you to predict my behaviour.
I think we're talking at cross purposes here. There are two forms of determinism (at least, but let's stick with two).

1. Our actions are determined by external forces -- God, the environment or some other external 'thing'.
2. Our actions are determined by internal forces -- the physical biology of our brain.

People like Richard Dawkins argue that our behaviour is fully determined by a combination of these two forces (excluding God, in his case).

What I am talking about is the latter -- internal biological determinism. That is, our actions are fully, completely and without intent determined by what goes on inside our brain. I don't think this is the case, but I want to try and understand why not.

I see a contradiction when you argue that the 'judgement machine' is fully biologically determined. If this is true, then it can only arrive at one 'judgement' for a given experience -- because this judgement machine is determined by your biology. That I might come up with a different judgement from you does not make it any less determined by our biology. If it is not fully biologically determined, then what is the source of the difference?

I'm not trying to disagree with you for the sake of it, I genuinely don't understand this problem; I realise that Searle's explanation is flawed as well. You might have a better explanation, so I'm poking at it to make sure I understand it properly.
Geoff332 is offline   Reply With Quote