[rmnunez]

there's apparently sufficient numbers to have brought us to the point where we are now, rm.

Indeed, and what point is that? Do you see the glass half empty and words like "stagnated", "bogged-down" or "stuck" first come to mind? Regime change was successful, a fairly representative national government has been installed through a democratic process -a first among Muslims in the Middle East. This is accomplishment enough, despite the insurgency. The insurgency goes in the minus column, the democratic experience is a plus.

Restoration of human rights at the pedestrian level has got to be worth something, under Saddam when one of the depraved sought you or yours out, you had no rights. Now, if your kid gets mangled in an accident with some military, there is at least some financial compensation. Abu Ghraib goes in the minus, but it doesn't reduce human rights levels generally to pre-occupation levels.

The economy is another factor to be balanced, things are worse now but its hard to say how much worse. Macroeconomic data is good but the details are unknown, lots of cell phones, more computers and telephone service, improvements in electrical power supply and water quality, but services are frequently disrupted. Medical services and education have seen improvements, but there are disruptions. Schools are used as targets by terrorists since united statians think of them as voting places and tend to put ballot boxes there. Its a mixed bag, pretty bad in lots of places, getting better in some, but obviously not as expected.

I would note these shortcomings all have to do with the derided "nationbuilding" component now attached to intervention. The UN should be doing this, they wouldn't draw ire or fire as they are harmless, they would be able to monitor united statian military excesses and rein them in a bit, they could document progress in reconstruction and even moderate with radicals. Dumb frogs stuck their oar in trying to protect their perfidious secret parastatal contracts with Saddam.

But this is correctable, the insurgency is small and the united statians are getting real good at tracking foreigners which helps get terrorists. The Coalition needs to put a bit more effort in reconstruction, do some major works in areas where the insurgency is low, concentrate on Basra, the oil refinery areas, Kurdish oil fields and pipelines, build some important dams or irrigation systems. This will provide jobs, generate income and some prosperity, produce a national benefit and can be done in relative safety since they aren't in insurgency-infested areas. Use the government controlled TV to promote the accomplishments with footage of the completed installations, of smiling Iraqis on the construction crews repairing and rebuilding, ribbon-cutting ceremonies with officers and local muftis exchanging keys in front of their new school or library.

The casualty rate is terrible, but not intolerable, buck up! This is a necessary cost in erradicating terrorism. It would be better if more people realized and contributed, but the US got its boot in and will bear the brunt. There is an alternative to insurgency and unrest (either dissuasion or withdrawal) but no alternative to terrorism. It won't go away if the west leaves them alone. Leaving Iraq (or Afghanistan) will invariably be read as a terrorist victory, a victory of Islamic fundamentalism over the infidel (capitalist imperalists in western terminology).

Ideally the US will find a way to transition into garrisons at the 4 envisaged regional mega-airbases they planned. This would reduce their profile and diminish some of the irritation. They need to step up the retraining and equipping of local regular Iraqi military forces, use them more like we are now seeing (at this "mosque" and in "Operation Swarmer" too). They're about a third of the way retrofitting the Iraqi military, with half as many more, they could reduce deployments by half. It will take a few months.

And like I said, now we have to start factoring in the growing numbers of competing militias.

Again it depends how you see through the glass, more competing militias will also clash unless they integrate and develop a vulnerable chain of command, leadership and headquarters. What we need to know is whether more people are joining the insurgency in an active way. If so, at what pace? If madrassas are overrun with aspiring martyrs there's a problem. I don't have this information, what I've seen is evidence which suggests the insurgency is fairly stable, it peaks with electoral events and otherwise averages just over 2 Coalitioneers and about 60 Iraqi civilians per day.